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Abstract
We provide a new and concise characterization of the Banzhaf value on the (linear) space of all
TU-games on a fixed player set by means of two transparent axioms. The first one is the well-
known Dummy player axiom. The second axiom, called Strong transfer invariance, indicates that
a player’s payoff is invariant to a transfer of worth between two coalitions he or she belongs to. To
prove this result we derive direct-sum decompositions of the space of all TU-games. We show that,
for each player, the space of all TU-games is the direct sum of the subspace of TU-games where
this player is dummy and the subspace spanned by the TU-games used to construct the transfers
of worth. This decomposition method has several advantages listed as concluding remarks.
Keywords: Banzhaf value, Dummy player axiom, Direct-sum decomposition, Strong Transfer
invariance
1. Introduction
The Banzhaf value, initially introduced in the context of voting games by Banzhaf (1965), and
later on extended to arbitrary games by, e.g., Owen (1975) and Dubey and Shapley (1979), is one
of the most popular values in cooperative games with transferable utilities (henceforth, TU-games).
The Banzhaf value assigns to each player the average of the marginal contribution to any coalition
he or she belongs to, and considers that each player is equally likely to enter to any coalition. It
has received numerous characterizations both on restricted domains and the full domain as well as
on a fixed player set and on variable player sets (e.g, Dubey, Shapley, 1979, Lehrer 1988, Haller
1994, Malawski 2002, Casajus 2012, 2014). It has also been extended to TU-games equipped with
a coalition structure (Owen, 1981) or a coalition configuration (Albizuri, Aurrekoetxea, 2006), to
TU-games on antimatroids (Algaba et al., 2004), to TU-games on convex geometries (Bilbao et
al., 1998), etc. Beyond the application to the measurement of voting power, the Banzhaf value has
also been successfully employed to model control relationships in corporate structures (see Crama
and Leruth, 2013, for a recent survey on this question).
In this note we provide a new and concise characterization of the Banzhaf value on the (linear)
space of all TU-games on a fixed player set by means of two transparent axioms. The first one
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is the well-known Dummy player axiom. The second axiom, called Strong transfer invariance,
indicates that a player’s payoff is invariant to a transfer of worth between two coalitions of which
he or she is a member. This means that if the worth of coalition varies of a certain amount and,
at the same time, the worth of another coalition varies by the opposite amount, then for members
of both coalitions the payoff allocation does not change.
Characterizations of the Banzhaf value which in addition to the Dummy player axiom invoke
only one another axiom can be found in Casajus (2012, 2014). The added axiom relies on a different
principle than the one included in the axiom of Strong transfer invariance. To be precise, these
characterizations use either an amalgamation principle between two players when the player set
is variable or a similar principle of collusion when the player set is fixed. Theorem 7 in Casajus
(2012) establishes that the Banzhaf value on variable player sets is characterized by the Dummy
player axiom and 2-efficiency. The axiom of 2-efficiency is an axiom of amalgamation due to Lehrer
(1988) which requires that the payoff of a player after amalgamation with another player is the
sum of the individual payoffs of the two players obtained before the operation of amalgamation.
Theorem 4 in Casajus (2014) establishes that the Banzhaf value on a fixed player set is the unique
value that satisfies the Dummy player axiom and Proxy neutrality or Association neutrality or
Distrust neutrality, provided that the player set does not contain two players. Proxy neutrality
and Association neutrality are borrowed from Haller (1994) and Distrust neutrality is invoked
by Malawski (2002). These axioms of collusion between two players are in the same spirit of
2-efficiency, but works on a fixed player set.
To prove our characterization, and contrary to the above-mentioned results by Casajus, we
derive direct-sum decompositions of the space of all TU-games. We show that, for each player,
the space of all TU-games is the direct sum of the subspace of TU-games where this player is
dummy and the subspace spanned by the TU-games used to construct the transfers of worth. This
decomposition method has several advantages that we list as a conclusion. This approach has been
used in Be´al et al. (2013) by means of additions and transfers of worth, and in Yokote (2014)
by means of additions of worth. Axioms of invariance constructed from the considered additions
and transfer are invoked to characterize the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) and the equal division
solution, but are not satisfied by the Banzhaf value.
The rest of this note is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the basic definitions and
introduce the axiom of Strong transfer invariance. Section 3 contains the main results. Section 4
makes some concluding remarks on the method of decomposition of the space of TU-games.
2. Preliminaries
Throughout this note, the cardinality of a finite set S will be denoted by |S|, the collection of
all subsets of S will be denoted by 2S , weak set inclusion will be denoted by ⊆, and proper set
inclusion will be denoted by ⊂. Also for notational convenience, we will write singleton {i} as i.
Let V be a real linear space equipped with an inner product “·”. Its additive identity element is
denoted by 0 and its dimension by dim(V ). Given a linear subspace U of V , we denote by U⊥ its
orthogonal complement. If V is the direct sum of the subspaces V 1 and V 2, i.e. V = V 1 + V 2 and
V 1 ∩ V 2 = {0}, we write V = V 1 ⊕ V 2. If X is a non-empty subset of V , then Sp(X) denotes the
smallest subspace containing X.
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a fixed and finite set of n players. Subsets of N are called coalitions,
while N is called the grand coalition. A cooperative game with transferable utility or simply a TU-
game on N is a function v : 2N −→ R such that v(∅) = 0. The set of TU-games v on N , denoted
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by VN , forms a linear space where dim(VN ) = 2
n−1. For each coalition S ⊆ N , v(S) describes the
worth of the coalition S when its members cooperate. The set H(v), called the support of v, is the
set of coalitions S ⊆ N such that v(S) 6= 0. For any two TU-games v and w in VN and any α ∈ R,
the TU-game αv + w ∈ VN is defined as follows: for each S ⊆ N , (αv + w)(S) = αv(S) + w(S).
The inner product v · w is defined as ∑S⊆N v(S)w(S).
For any non-empty coalition T ⊆ N , the Dirac TU-game δT ∈ VN is defined as: δT (T ) = 1,
and δT (S) = 0 for each other S ⊆ N . Clearly, the collection of all Dirac TU-games is a basis for
VN . For any i ∈ N , the i-dictator TU-game ui ∈ VN is defined as ui(S) = 1 if S 3 i, and ui(S) = 0
for each S 63 i.
Player i ∈ N is a dummy player in v if:
∀S 3 i, v(S)− v(S \ i)− v(i) = 0.
Denote by Di the subspace of VN where player i ∈ N is dummy.
Player is null in v if:
∀S 3 i, v(S)− v(S \ i) = 0.
Denote by D0i the subspace of VN where player i ∈ N is null.
A value Φ on VN is a mapping Φ : VN −→ Rn which uniquely determines, for each v ∈ VN and
each i ∈ N , a payoff Φi(v) ∈ R for participating to v ∈ VN .
Dummy player axiom. A value Φ satisfies the Dummy player axiom if, for each i ∈ N and each
v ∈ Di, it holds that: Φi(v) = v(i).
Null player axiom. A value Φ satisfies the Null player axiom if, for each i ∈ N and each v ∈ D0i ,
it holds that: Φi(v) = 0.
The Dummy player axiom implies the Null player axiom. A well-known value satisfying the
Dummy player axiom is the Banzhaf value (Banzhaf, 1965), Bz, defined on VN as:
∀i ∈ N, Bzi(v) = 1
2n−1
∑
S⊆N :S3i
(
v(S)− v(S \ i)).
Because Bzi(v) only depends on the sum of the contributions to all i’s coalitions, Bzi is also
invariant to a transfer of worth between any two coalitions containing i. Let us elaborate on this
property. Consider any TU-game v ∈ VN , any pair of distinct coalitions S+ ⊆ N and S− ⊆ N
and any real number α ∈ R. The TU-game v + α(δS+ − δS−) ∈ VN is obtained from v ∈ VN
through the (S+, S−, α)-transfer. We also write that a (S+, S−, α)-transfer involves player i ∈ N
if i ∈ S+∩S−. By definition, Bzi is not altered by a (S+, S−, α)-transfer involving i, which implies
that Bz satisfies the following axiom.
Strong transfer invariance. A value Φ on VN satisfies Strong transfer invariance if, for each v ∈
VN and each (S
+, S−, α)-transfer, it holds that: for each i ∈ S+∩S−, Φi(v) = Φi(v+α(δS+−δS−)).
Strong transfer invariance can be interpreted as follows. Suppose that the size of the coalitions
does not matter in the coalition formation process. Imagine further that each player owns a part
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of the worth of each coalitions he belongs to, which he can freely transfer from one of his coalitions
to another. Then, the axiom simply requires that such a transfer of worth is neither beneficial nor
detrimental for the player. In a sense, the axiom is weak since it is silent of the influence of the
transfer on the other players.
3. Results
It turns out that the combination of Strong transfer invariance and the Dummy player axiom
characterizes Bz on VN .
Proposition 1 A value Φ on VN satisfies Strong transfer invariance and the Dummy player axiom
if and only if Φ = Bz.
To prove the statement of Proposition 1, we will use the following decomposition result of the
space VN .
Proposition 2 For each i ∈ N , it holds that VN = ∆i ⊕ Di, where ∆i is the subspace of VN
defined as ∆i = Sp(Yi), where
Yi =
{
δS+ − δS− : S+ 6= S−, i ∈ S+ ∩ S−
}
.
Furthermore, dim(∆i) = 2
n−1 − 1.
Proof. We first prove that ∆i = U
⊥
i , where
Ui = Sp
({
δS : S 63 i
} ∪ {ui}),
and dim(∆i) = 2
n−1 − 1.
(i) We show that ∆i ⊆ U⊥i . It suffices to verify that: Yi ⊆ U⊥i . Pick any element (δS+ − δS−) ∈ Yi.
First, consider any S 63 i. We obviously have:
(δS+ − δS−) · δS = 0.
Second, it is also clear that:
(δS+ − δS−) · ui = 0.
Therefore, ∆i ⊆ U⊥i .
(ii) We show that ∆i ⊇ U⊥i . We proceed by induction on the size of the support H(v) of v ∈ U⊥i .
If |H(v)| = 0, then v = 0 and so v ∈ ∆i. Assume v ∈ ∆i for all v ∈ U⊥i such that |H(v)| ≤ h, and
pick any v ∈ U⊥i such that |H(v)| = h + 1. Consider any S+ ∈ H(v). On the one hand, because
v ∈ U⊥i , we have v · δS = v(S) = 0 for each S 63 i, and so S+ 3 i. On the other hand, v ∈ U⊥i
implies ui · v = 0, i.e., ∑
S⊆N :S3i
v(S) = 0.
Therefore, there exists a coalition S− ∈ H(v), distinct from S+ such that S− 3 i. Consider the
TU-game w = v − v(S+)(δS+ − δS−). We have w ∈ U⊥i and |H(w)| < |H(v)|. By the induction
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hypothesis w ∈ ∆i. It is also clear that −v(S+)(δS+−δS−) ∈ ∆i so that v = w−v(S+)(δS+−δS−) ∈
∆i. Thus, ∆i ⊇ U⊥i .
¿From (i)-(ii), we conclude that U⊥i = ∆i. To determine the dimension of ∆i, we use the fact
that dim(Ui⊕U⊥i ) = dim(VN ) = 2n−1, and that the elements of
{
δS : S 63 i
}∪{ui} are obviously
linearly independent. Therefore,
dim(∆i) = dim(U
⊥
i ) = dim(VN )− dim(Ui) = 2n − 1− 2n−1 = 2n−1 − 1,
as claimed.
It remains to prove show that ∆i ∩Di = {0}. Pick any v ∈ ∆i ∩Di. On the one hand, v ∈ ∆i
and ∆i = U
⊥
i mean that:
∀S 63 i, v(S) = 0, and
∑
S⊆N :S3i
v(S) = 0. (1)
On the other hand, v ∈ Di means that:
∀S 3 i, v(S)− v(S \ i)− v(i) = 0. (2)
Combining (1) and (2), we get:
∀S 3 i, v(S) = v(i) and
∑
S⊆N :S3i
v(S) = 0.
Therefore, the unique possibility is v = 0, as desired. 
Proof. (of Proposition 1) Consider any value Φ satisfying Strong addition invariance and the
Dummy player axiom on VN . Pick any v ∈ VN and any i ∈ N . By Proposition 2, there is exactly
one ri ∈ ∆i and exactly one wi ∈ Di such that:
v = ri + wi.
Applying Strong addition invariance and the Dummy player axiom on Φi, we obtain:
Φi(v) = Φi(r
i + wi) = Φi(w
i) = wi(i),
which proves that Φi is uniquely determines on VN . As player i has been chosen arbitrarily in N ,
conclude that Φ is uniquely determined on VN . Because Bz satisfies also Strong addition invariance
and the Dummy player axiom, we obtain Bz = Φ on VN , as desired. 
4. Concluding remarks
The logic behind the result contained in Proposition 1 is very intuitive. Pick any v ∈ VN and any
i ∈ N . For each coalition S+ 3 i, if v(S+)−v(S+\i) 6= Bzi(v), then there necessarily exists another
coalition S− 3 i such that v(S−)−v(S−\i) 6= Bzi(v). Apply the (S+, S−,Bzi(v)−v(S+)+v(S+\i))-
transfer to v. It follows that the number of coalitions S 3 i such that v(S) − v(S \ i) 6= Bzi(v)
decreases of at least one unit. This operation can be repeated as many times as necessary to reach
a TU-game vi in which i is dummy and such that vi(i) = Bzi(v). By the Dummy player axiom
Φi(v
i) = Bzi(v). Because at each step of this procedure we apply admissible transfers with respect
to the axiom of Strong addition invariance, we obtain Φi(v) = Φi(v
i) = Bzi(v). However, the
direct-sum decompositions of the space of TU-games contained in Proposition 2 allows to obtain a
stronger result and to understand the effects of each axiom on VN and Bz, which would have been
hidden otherwise. Here is a list of consequences of Proposition 2.
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1. Proposition 2 ensures that the Dummy player axiom cannot be replaced by the Null player
axiom in Proposition 1. Indeed, because D0i ⊂ Di, we obtain VN 6= ∆i + D0i so that the
proof of Proposition 1 would not longer hold. In this sense, the characterization obtained in
Proposition 1 is sharp.
2. If we want to characterize Bz by using the Null player axiom instead of the Dummy player
axiom, the previous remark indicates that we need (at least one) another axiom. Consider
the following version of the axiom of covariance:
∀v ∈ VN ,∀α ∈ R,∀i ∈ N, Φi(v + αui) = Φi(v) + α. (3)
Obviously, Bz satisfies this axiom since Bz is a linear function on VN and Bzi(ui) = 1 for i,
and Bzj(ui) = 0 for each j ∈ N \ i. Next, noting that dim(D0i ) = 2n−1 − 1, it is not difficult
to see that Di = D
0
i ⊕ Sp(ui) so that:
∀i ∈ N, VN = ∆i ⊕D0i ⊕ Sp(ui).
Using the above direct-sum decompositions of VN and proceeding as in the proof of Proposi-
tion 2, we conclude that Bz is the unique value on VN satisfying Strong transfer invariance,
the Null player axiom and the version of covariance as expressed in (3).
3. It is known that Bzi : VN −→ R is linear and onto so that the dimension of its kernel
is dim(VN ) − dim(R) = 2n − 2. Consider any TU-game v ∈ ∆i ⊕ D0i . Using the unique
decomposition v = ri + w0,i, where ri ∈ ∆i and w0,i ∈ D0i , we obtain:
Bzi(v) = Bzi(r
i + w0,i) = Bzi(w
0,i) = 0,
where the second inequality is obtained by Strong transfer invariance and the third equality
by the Null player axiom. Therefore, ∆i ⊕D0i is contained in the kernel of Bzi. But as
dim(∆i ⊕D0i ) = dim(∆i) + dim(D0i ) = 2n−1 − 1 + 2n−1 − 1 = 2n − 2,
we conclude that ∆i ⊕ D0i spans the kernel of Bzi. From this result and the fact that
VN = ∆i ⊕D0i ⊕ Sp(ui), we are able to solve the following inverse problem: for each i ∈ N ,
for each αi ∈ R, find all v ∈ VN that Bzi(v) = αi. For each i ∈ N , the solution set is the
subset of TU-games v ∈ VN such that v = yi + αiui for some yi ∈ ∆i ⊕D0i .
4. The direct-sum decompositions ∆i ⊕ Di, i ∈ N , also ensures that the axiom of Strong
invariance and the Dummy player axiom are logically independent. Indeed, define the value
Φ on VN , where VN = ∆i ⊕Di for each i ∈ N , as follows:
∀v ∈ VN ,∀i ∈ N, Φi(v) = Bzi(ri) + wi(N),
where ri + wi is the unique decomposition of v along ∆i and Di. This value satisfies Strong
addition invariance but violates the Dummy player axiom. Now assume that Φ is defined as:
∀v ∈ VN ,∀i ∈ N, Φi(v) = ri(i) + Bzi(wi).
This value satisfies the Dummy player axiom but violates Strong addition invariance.
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